The Oradour-sur-Glane Massacre
The SS version according to Marc Rikmenspoel
TULLE & ORADOUR: THE GERMAN VIEW
by Marc Rikmenspoel
The events at Tulle and Oradour in the
French Dordogne province in early June 1944 have long been considered
a black mark against the 2. SS-Panzer Division Das Reich, and
against the German forces as a whole. The case against them is
widely told, but the German version of these events is barely
known. The French version is based largely on the testimony and
accounts of Communist Party members. Sometimes these were not
even French citizens, but Spaniards in exile after their Civil
War, Poles in exile from Poland, or Soviet citizens who fled
from service in German units. These stories were told at a time
when emotions still ran high from the Second World War. This
renders their accounts suspect, and, in all fairness, they should
be balanced against the admittedly self-interested German version
of the events.
The Sperrle Orders were issued by Luftwaffe
Field Marshall Hugo Sperrle on February 3, 1944. These ordered
harsh reprisals to terrorist attacks, and tasked officers with
placing the welfare of their men ahead of that of the civilian
population. It was hoped that prompt, ruthless measures would
spare lives in the long run. (1, 27-28)
Das Reich understood that it was to help
pacify the Dordogne, and would be fighting civilians in conjunction
with other German formations and the French Milice. Division
members were prepared to carry out countermeasures in response
to terrorist attacks. The main body of the division set out to
the north from its assembly area near Bordeaux at 8:00 hours
on June 8, with plans to reach its destination in the Tulle-Limoges
area that evening. SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 4 Der Fuehrer
commander SS-Standartenfuehrer Sylvester Stadler commanded the
vanguard. SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 3 Deutschland commander
SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Guenther-Eberhard Wisliceny commanded
those elements of Das Reich that were not yet fully mobile, and
remained near Bordeaux. (1, 9-12)
As the march progressed, the vanguard
received reports of Maquis activity. Local German town and village
commanders had set up roadblocks and checkpoints along the roads.
The first resistance was met late in the afternoon when French
civilians manned a roadblock and fired at the lead motorcycle
platoon of 15./Der Fuehrer. They were quickly scattered. Brive,
at the southernmost edge of the assembly area, was reached at
18:30 hours. There the Division command group came forward, and
joined the town commander. This man was in contact with LXVI
Reserve Army Corps headquarters, to whom Das Reich commander
SS-Brigadefuehrer Heinz Lammerding was scheduled to report. Lammerding
did report, and was informed that III./95. Security Regiment
was surrounded in Tulle by Maquis forces. Lammerding was ordered
to free the unit. (1,12)
The Das Reich recon unit, SS-Panzer Aufklarungs
Abteilung 2, was sent towards Tulle under its commander SS-Sturmbannfuehrer
Heinrich Wulf. It was fired upon briefly, half way to Tulle.
It reached Tulle at 21:00 hours, and secured the town in heavy
fighting. Nine men of the unit were killed in action, while the
III./95 was rescued. The Das Reich command group established
itself in Tulle. (1, 12-13)
In the meantime, the main body of Der
Fuehrer reached Limoges. They were warmly greeted by the garrison,
since the town had been isolated, though not attacked, by Maquis
for the past two days. Der Fuehrer headquarters was established
in Limoges, and elements of the regiment spread out to occupy
surrounding towns and villages during June 9. (1, 13)
In the early morning hours of June 10
the O1 (orderly officer) of SS-Panzerjaeger Abteilung 2 (the
Das Reich antitank unit), SS-Obersturmfuehrer Gerlach, arrived
in Limoges. He was exhausted, and clad only in his underwear.
He had been sent out with six other men in three cars to find
billets for his unit north of Limoges on the morning of June
9. His car had pulled ahead of the others, and was stopped by
Maquis. He and his driver were taken prisoner, and had their
clothing torn off. They were driven away in a French truck to
be interrogated by a Maquis commander. Gerlach saw a sign announcing
the town he was brought to as Oradour-sur-Glane. He was taken
out of the truck in the town, and confronted with many armed
civilians, including women. Soon, he was put back in the truck,
and driven several kilometers into the country for execution.
After being taken out of the truck again, Gerlach's driver resisted
strongly. Gerlach used the opportunity to make a break, and was
successful. Hours later he arrived in Limoges, and reported the
Maquis activity in Oradour. (1, 14-17)
In the light of day on June 9, Das Reich
took stock of the situation in Tulle. Forty men of III./95 were
discovered dead near a school. They showed signs of execution,
and local civilians reported the men had been killed after dropping
their weapons and surrendering. Only an SD officer with them
had a pistol in his hand. Most of the bodies were mutilated,
some had had their genitals cut off and stuffed into their mouths.
Others had been covered with excrement. One man had holes in
his heels with a rope through them, and a ruined face, indicating
that he had been tied to the back of a truck and driven around.
Other bodies were found around town, bringing the total German
dead to 64. The III./95 had reported 80 missing, meaning several
were unaccounted for. And 9 more Germans died in rescuing the
garrison, as mentioned before. (1, 18-19)
All civilian men found in Tulle were
gathered in the yard of the local ammunition factory. The operation
was directed by Das Reich 1c (third general staff officer, responsible
for intelligence) SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Aurel Kowatsch. He was
aided by the Mayor of Tulle, local officials, and the manager
of the factory in selecting all non-residents and suspicious
individuals. The remaining men were released. From the suspects
120 men were selected for execution as guerrillas by SD official
Walter. A number were released because of their youth, and then
the remaining 98 were executed, at the direction of Kowatsch,
by the Pioneer platoon of SS-Panzer Aufklarungs Abteilung 2.
Since the suspects were not soldiers, and since they fought in
violation of the Hague Convention, the executions were by means
of hanging instead of the shooting. Additionally, it was hoped
that the many dead bodies hanging in plain site would deter future
Maquis attacks. (1, 19-21)
Also on June 9, Das Reich's SPW (armored
personnel carrier) abteilung, III./Der Fuehrer, was ordered by
LXVI Reserve Army Corps to reoccupy the town of Gueret, 60 km
from its present billeting area. Gueret had been captured by
Maquis on June 7, and a German Army attack from the east on June
8 had failed to retake it. Now III./DF approached from the west.
It accidentally skirmished with the German Army unit, which had
just recaptured the town, and suffered several wounded. These
were sent back towards Limoges in two SPW, which were overtaken
on the way by III./DF commander SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Helmut Kaempfe
alone at the wheel of his command car. He was driving ahead to
meet with the mayor of a town along the route. A few minutes
later the two SPW found Kaempfe's car, deserted and still running.
Kaempfe was gone, with no sign of a fight. The main body of III./DF
left Gueret in Army hands and followed Kaempfe and the SPW back
towards its billets. Upon reaching the car, it searched the surrounding
area without finding any trace of Kaempfe or his apparent captors.
(1, 21-23)
The two medical SPW arrived during the
night in Limoges and reported Kaempfe's disappearance. SS-Sturmbannfuehrer
Otto Weidinger, serving in Der Fuehrer regimental headquarters,
was sent back to Tulle to report the occurrence, with a motorcycle
platoon as escort. The terrain was too broken up to allow radio
communication. At about this time, Weidinger learned later, 62
additional Germans had been killed by the Maquis near Naves,
10 km south of Tulle. This brought the total German deaths in
the area to at least 126, plus the nine SS men killed retaking
Tulle.
In the early morning of June 10 Kaempfe's
identity papers were found in one of the main streets of Limoges.
They seemed to indicate that Kaempfe had been driven through
Limoges during the night. Later that morning I./DF commander
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Adolf Diekmann reported to regimental headquarters
in Limoges from his billeting area in St. Junien, west of town.
Two civilians had come to him, stating that a high ranking German
officer was being held prisoner by the Maquis in Oradour-sur-Glane.
The officer was to be ceremoniously executed and burned that
evening by the staff of the Maquis headquarters there, in front
of the people of the town, the majority of whom were cooperating
with the partisans. Similar information had been gained by the
SD office in Limoges from its agents, and it had reported this
to Stadler just before Diekmann arrived. (1, 25)
Diekmann requested permission to drive
with one of his companies to Oradour to try to free his friend,
Kaempfe. Stadler agreed, stipulating that Diekmann was to negotiate
for Kaempfe's release if at all possible. He was only to occupy
the town and use force as a last resort. He could take hostages
to trade for Kaempfe if the officer could not be recovered otherwise.
Stadler wanted Kaempfe kept alive, and was willing to take unusually
lenient measures to make sure of this, because Kaempfe was his
friend, an outstanding officer, and a valuable SPW specialist.
Gerlach helped Diekmann interpret the maps of the area. (1, 25-26)
During the day the SD office put a captured
Maquis officer at Stadler's disposal. The man was released so
that he could bring his comrades an offer. If Kaempfe was released
unharmed, 30 additional captured Maquisards and 40,000 Francs
would be turned over to the Maquis as ransom. The released man
called once to say he had not yet met up with those holding Kaempfe;
he was never heard from again. Afterwards, the Germans concluded
that Kaempfe must have already been dead when the officer did
establish contact with his fellows. (1, 29-30)
Diekmann reported back to Stadler late
in the afternoon of June 10. He said he had driven with his 3./DF
under SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Kahn to Oradour-sur-Glane. There he
had met resistance from Maquis, including the town's population.
Murdered German Army soldiers had been found in the town after
it had been occupied. Weapons and ammunition had been found in
many of the houses. All the men in Oradour, about 180, had been
rounded up and shot. The houses containing munitions had been
burned down, with the flames eventually spreading to the church.
It had burned down accompanied by violent explosions. No captive
hostages had been brought back, and Kaempfe had not been found.
Stadler was furious about this report, since it did not comply
with his orders. He promised to bring court-martial proceedings
against Diekmann, and later did so. (1, 31-32)
Diekmann was obviously distraught about
the whole affair. He sought and found death in Normandy soon
after Das Reich arrived there later that June. Between the testimony
gathered by Das Reich's judiciary branch for the court-martial,
and that obtained at the French sponsored Oradour trial in 1953,
a more complete picture of events emerged.
At the edge of Oradour 3./DF had found
a German ambulance with two medics and four wounded men. The
driver and the other medic had been chained to the steering wheel,
and then they and the wounded had been burned alive. To establish
order in the town Diekmann had the population gathered. The women
and children had been placed in the church while the houses were
searched. The men were kept under guard in some stables. Munitions
were found in many houses, which was yet more evidence of collaboration
with the Maquis. Several houses had been burned down when the
church suddenly, without warning, had blown up. Diekmann concluded
he was under attack, and had the men shot. This may actually
have been a moral crime, and it went against Stadler's orders,
but it fit within the Sperrle orders. This was the only part
of the Tulle-Oradour incidents that was a crime, and Diekmann
obviously felt himself guilty. He had concluded that Kaempfe
was dead and that hostages were useless. Survivors were pulled
from the rubble of the church, and then Diekmann mounted up his
men and drove off. (1, 36-38)
An alternate version some Germans offered
was that once the men and women were separated, Diekmann gave
the mayor of Oradour half an hour to secure Kaempfe's release.
If this was not done, all the men would be shot. When the time
expired with no sign of the mayor, or of Kaempfe, the men were
indeed shot. (2, 6-7)
This leaves the question of what happened
at the church. It is worth mentioning that 3./DF was a normal
panzergrenadier truck-borne infantry company. It did not possess
specialized weapons for demolition work, and, in light of its
expected mission, was not assigned any from regimental units.
The Limousin Society for the Study of History and Architecture
made a survey of the church in 1924. It recorded the solid, stone
construction of the building. (3, 4)
The bronze bell of the church melted.
Fire is not sufficient for this. Wood burns at 200-400 degrees
centigrade, while bronze will not melt at less than 1250 degrees.
There was obviously something else at work. Also, the destruction
in the church is principally within a circular area under the
bell tower. There is damage elsewhere, but the obvious conclusion
is that explosives under the bell turned it into a massive hollow
charge. After this, fire spread to some other flammable items
in the church. Naturally, stone doesn't burn, and this supports
the idea that the destruction must have come from an explosion.
(3, 7-11)
The Germans could not have simply set
the church on fire, as was later claimed. As mentioned previously,
the 3./DF had no specialized weapons available. So why did the
explosion occur? Some answers seem to come in the affidavit sworn
by retired Bundeswehr Oberstleutnant Eberhard Matthes on November
16, 1980. It reads as follows:
"In addition to numerous private
and official visits, in November and December of 1963 I was at
the French training area of La Courtine in my official capacity
as an officer of the Bundeswehr, and in the summer of 1964 I
spent some time with my family in southwest France (Massif Central).
As a former participant in the war and
regional chairman of the association of repatriated soldiers
I was interested in all matters that had to do with reprisals
and the shooting of hostages and so on, and consequently I visited
Oradour-sur-Glaneon both occasions.
Upon my first visit in December 1963,
in German Bundeswehr uniform and in a Bundeswehr jeep with a
driver, my experiences were as follows:
1) The part of the village that had been
destroyed in 1944 had been turned into a kind of open-air museum
with a kiosk selling drinks, cigarettes, etc. as well as brochures
telling of the happenings in Oradour in June 1944, the latter
at an astonishingly low price.
2) Immediately after my arrival the jeep
was surrounded by children and also by, for the most part, elderly
inhabitants and we were warmly welcomed.
3) When these older inhabitants - in
1963 they would have been between 50 and 60 years old - saw me
reading one of the brochures, some of them said I should not
believe everything I read. A lot of what had occurred had been
different to what the brochures said. I was naturally somewhat
perplexed and said that it was bad enough if German soldiers
had fired upon women and children in the church that they had
set fire to or whilst they were attempting to escape from it.
The answer to this was quite clear and
unequivocal: the church had not been set fire to by the Germans
in the first place. On the contrary, SS soldiers had risked their
own lives to save several women and children from the burning
church. Two women in the group around me even said that they
themselves had been rescued by German soldiers, otherwise they
would not be standing there that day.
4) In the meantime the mayor had arrived,
who introduced himself and welcomed me very warmly: I was the
first German soldier in uniform to visit Oradour since the war.
He was very pleased about this. Politically he was a left-winger,
but France and the FRG were allies and friends. One had to accept
the past and learn the right lessons from it. And in the war
wrong had been done everywhere. I immediately confronted him
with what I had heard beforehand from the inhabitants, to which
he replied that the Maquis had also done a lot of wrong to German
soldiers at that time, for which reason none of the accused Germans
in the Oradour trial had been condemned to death and almost all
of those who were imprisoned had been released.
5) I can remember one episode very clearly.
Near the ruins of the church there was, among other things, an
old child's pram with a sign saying this pram had burnt out with
a child in it during the massacre. I believe it was the mayor
himself who, upon seeing it, smiled and said that the remains
of a pram had indeed been found on that spot, but now that Oradour
had become a kind of place of pilgrimage, and the village also
profited from the visitors financially, such things had to be
renewed every few years.
6) Understandably I had now become very
much interested in the Oradour incident. I had an opportunity
of talking to French officers, with whom we had a very open and
comradely relationship and without any reservations. One high-ranking
French officer answered my questions as follows:
'One of the major reasons for the actions
of the Germans in Oradour in June 1944 was no doubt the fact
that the advancing Germans had found a burning or already burnt-out
German ambulance right in front of the village. All six persons
in the ambulance must have been burnt alive. The driver and the
person beside him were tied to the steering wheel. This was undoubtedly
a deed perpetrated by the Maquis. Entwined with this was the
mysterious and agonizing killing, in the same area and at about
the same time, of a high-ranking German officer who had fallen
into the hands of the Maquis. In the same situation French troops
would also have had to take reprisals, possibly involving the
shooting of hostages, as provided for in the laws and customs
for war on land from 1939 through 1945. For these reasons there
are many French soldiers and officers who do not visit Oradour
in an official role. And for the same reasons (as far as the
officer knew) no official military ceremonies are held in Oradour.'
7) Upon my second - private - visit to
Oradour in the summer of 1964 I found further confirmation of
what I had been told in that the owner of the kiosk or attendant
(also an elderly man), from whom we bought something to drink,
answered as follows to my remarks about the brochures: There
were a number of witnesses who knew exactly how everything had
actually happened in 1944. They had either not been heard at
all during the trial, however, or they had to limit themselves
to irrelevant details. The accused Germans had also received
prison sentences and been released soon afterwards, instead of
being sentenced to death, because otherwise some of the witnesses
would no doubt have 'spilled the beans' and told what really
had happened" (1, 38-41)
The explosion in the church was actually
set off by a civilian. This individual is even believed to have
shot a civilian while escaping from the church via the vestry,
after setting a fuse. (3, 10) Speculation is that a member of
the Maquis, perhaps not even a Frenchman, committed the deed
in so that the Germans would be blamed. This would presumably
cause even more civilians to join the resistance. Instead, the
deaths at Tulle and Oradour ended Maquis activity in the Dordogne
through the German withdrawal in August. (1, 32 & 47)
In 1969 Otto Weidinger met the former
Maquis chief for the Dordogne, Rene Jugie, who called himself
Gao, in Paris. Jugie confirmed that Oradour-sur-Glane had indeed
been full of weapons and ammunition. It had been the supply center
for all the towns and villages in the Dordogne. Any argument
that Oradour had been randomly selected for destruction by the
Germans thus received another nail in its coffin. (1, 42)
The final part of this tale concerns
the Tulle and Oradour trials held in 1951 and 1953 respectively.
In the Tulle trial Heinz Lammerding and Aurel Kowatsch were sentenced
to death in absentia. SS-Hauptscharfuehrer Otto Hoff, commander
of the Pioneer Platoon, received life in prison. Heinrich Wulf
received 10 years at hard labor and 10 years where he was forbidden
to answer France. Wulf was pardoned and released in May 1952,
while Hoff was released in 1953. (1, 48-49)
The Oradour trial resulted in massive
unrest in Alsace, which had been reincorporated into France in
1945. Many of the recent replacements for Das Reich, received
in the spring of 1944, were Alsatians. The men, in most cases
still minors in 1944, had been born as French citizens. In 1945
they again became French citizens, and in 1951 several were put
on trial, despite having been decorated for service in the French
Army in Indochina. These men were imprisoned separately from
the German survivors of 3./Der Fuehrer during the trial, which
ran from January 13 to March 12, 1953. The verdicts in the trial
sentenced 43 men of 3./DF to death in absentia, largely to placate
those parts of the population crying for revenge. A German nco
who had been transferred to the Waffen-SS from the Luftwaffe,
and an Alsatian nco who had volunteered for the Waffen-SS, were
sentenced to death in their presence. The other Germans present
received between 8 and 12 years at hard labor. The other Alsatians
present, all of whom had been conscripted, received between 4
and 8 years at hard labor, but soon had their sentences suspended.
They were released immediately after the trial, to the joy of
Alsace. One German was acquitted, while his fellows were released
during 1953. The two condemned men soon had their sentences reduced
to life in prison. They were released in 1959. (1, 47-48)
The results of the trials show the truth
of the incidents. The accused were victims of a witch hunt. They
might have received extremely stiff punishment if survivors of
the Oradour church had not started to reveal the actual events.
Former members of the Maquis also started to tell the true story
about these towns, in their case to the Communist press. Alsace
was upset over having conscripted Alsatians tried, Germany was
upset that the German comrades-in-arms of the Alsatians received
harsher sentences. (2,7)
These events led to the pardons and suspended
sentences. The French government then made Heinz Lammerding the
target of its wrath. It attempted to have Lammerding extradited
from West Germany to France to be put on trial for Oradour. In
light of the available evidence, the West German government refused
to comply. Lammerding died peacefully in West Germany on January
13, 1971, despite having been condemned to death in absentia
again by France. (2, 7-8)
In sum, Tulle and Oradour were tragic
events. But the only possible crime was the shooting of the men
of Oradour without separating Maquis suspects from the rest.
The man responsible, Diekmann, essentially committed suicide
soon after. The events in Tulle were covered by the Hague Convention.
The affair of the church in Oradour was a crime for the Maquis,
and blame rests with them. The happenings at Tulle and Oradour
have too long been labeled as simple German atrocities, and should
no longer give Das Reich a black reputation. It is time for the
truth.
Many works dealing with Tulle and Oradour
were consulted in preparing this piece. Three sources were noted
in the text, they appear below in the order in which they were
referred:
1) Tulle and Oradour: A Franco-German
Tragedy, by Otto Weidinger, translated by Colin B. Newberry.
Privately published, 1985.
2) Oradour-sur-Glane: A "Clear-cut"
Atrocity?, by Richard Landwehr, in Siegrunen Magazine, vol. IV,
#3 (21 overall), September 1980.
3) Stonecry, The Scream of the Stones:
Research in the ruins of the church in Oradour-sur-Glane to verify
a war crime, by Pierre Moreau, translated from the French. Privately
published, no date.
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